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ROADMAP-European Sustainable Nuclear Industrial Initiative
 Most mature technology SFR
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Roadmap- Generation IV Forum (GIF)
Criteria
Sustainability 
improved fuel utilization - capacity of breeding 
minimization of waste - recycling  (capability of Minor Actinide (MA) recycling with minor 
impact on core safety parameters, -homogeneous core configuration or  Minor Actinide 
Breeding Blanket (MABB) option)
Economics
comparable to other energy sources (reactor + fuel cycle) 
Long cycle lengths  high loading factors (low reactivity swing, steady power shape) 
Improved lifetimes for fuel & absorbing elements (material performance, optimized 
fuel pin, absorbing materials with low efficiency) 
Compact core size
Safety  (see safety last chapter)
high level of safety and operational reliability
Very low probability of core damage accidents (CDA)
Elimination of need for off-site emergency response 
Proliferation : 
Low susceptibility to diversion & physical protection against deliberate aggression 
 FAST SPECTRUM REACTORS
R. Stieglitz – Seminar GRS
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Roadmap- Generation IV Forum (GIF)
FAST SPECTRUM REACTORS
fission chain reaction sustained by fast neutrons 
no need for neutron moderator, but 
requires fuel highly rich of fissile material (>>10%)
KEY FEATURES of FAST REACTORS
higher flux (factor 10) material damage
higher volumetric power high temperature gradients, 
Fast in all views (neutronics -many groups, TH- TM transients)
R. Stieglitz – Seminar GRS
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Fast reactors
Why power density and dynamics are so important ?
Feedback does not only depend on Doppler-effect and coolant density
Thermal changes 
 thermal expansion of structures
 Impact on reactivity (+ or minus)






CR driveline expansion (+ /–)
 detailed representation
mandatory for reliable safety analysis
R. Stieglitz – Seminar GRS
Not considered in this context in depth
strongback
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Fast Reactors – Nuclide composition neutronics
R. Stieglitz – Seminar GRS
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Structural materials and coolant (SFR)
Main fission products
Actinides (Th-U and U-Pu cycles)
Products of actinides decay
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Most advanced Pool Type Design 







u0,mean , u0,max    2.9, 4.1m/s
Core p 3 bar
© Kotake, 2010
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Fast reactors- principle design 
Functional layout – pool (vertical cut)
R. Stieglitz – Seminar GRS
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Fast reactors- principle design 
Functional layout – pool (vertical cut)
R. Stieglitz – Seminar GRS
© Latge, Devictor, 2015, Astrid design options
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SFR- several thousand reactor years accumulated
First reactor in world EBR-I –sodium cooled -20.Dec. 1951, net power 800W !!!
and new projects under way worldwide  as JSFR, CDFR, PGSFR, CFBR, ASTRID, BN1200
R. Stieglitz – Seminar GRS
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SFR- ASTRID 
General features SFR 
introduction of sodium plenum
(enhanced leakage- void worth )
reflectors at top and bottom/
low coolant/fissile ratio
R. Stieglitz – Seminar GRS
Modifications for ASTRID
Innovative core design 
Heterogeneous axial enrichment
Separation in two cores
(inner/outer)
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SFR- ASTRID 
Core calculations for ASTRID
heterogeneous power distribution across core
enlarging control rod worth, reducing void worth
 enhanced safety performance




Total core power, MW 1500.00
Subcore powers, MW 973.98 526.02
SA number in subcores 177 114
Subcore volumes, m3 5.27 3.70
Average SA power in subcores, MW 5.503 4.614
Subcore radial peak.factor (for SA) 1.045 1.273
Maximum power density in core, W/ccm 360.4
Average power density, W/ccm 167.2
Volumetric peak.factor 2.156
Maximum power density, ccm 360.4 287.5
Average power density in subcores, 
W/ccm
184.8 142.1
Volumetric peak.factors in subcores 1.950 2.024
Maximum linear power, W/cm 446.1 355.9
Average linear power, W/cm 228.8 175.9
Maximum power density in av.SA, W/ccm 343.9 225.2
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inner core
outer core
Normalized power at av.SA
Core height, cm
© Ponomarev, PhD, 2015
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SFR-ASTRID 
R. Stieglitz – Seminar GRS
© official time table, CEA, 12/2014
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KEY DATA
Thermal power 700 MW
Gross electric power 300 MW
Net plant efficiency 43%
Coolant pure lead
Core inlet temperature 420°C
Core outlet temperature 540°C
Coolant velocity in the core <1.67m/s
Core coolant pressure drop 1.55 bar
4 coolant loops, 4 pumps 500kW each
Feedwater temperature 355°C
Steam temperature 525°C
Steam pressure 27 MPa
Refuelling intervals 300 days
Vessel material Cr16Ni10
Vessel air preheaters                420 - 470°C
LFR :BREST-300 Prototype Reactor 
(Nikiet, Russia)
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LFR : BREST-300 Core Design










8 Reflector Blocks 







Avg. burn-up: 61.5 
GWd/t 
Pu content: 2260 kg
Active core height: 1100 
mm
Inner Core Diameter: 
1280 mm




Fuel pin diam. 9.4 to 
10.5mm
Peak core power density 835 MW/m3
Average core power dens. 510 MW/m3 Max. cladding surface temp: 650°C
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Reactor applications- LFR- FA design  
Reactor type SVBR BREST JNC ELSY PDS-ADS EFIT 
Coolant LBE Pb LBE Pb LBE Pb 
Lattice    /   
Spacer types honey tube wire wrap Honey honey honey
Pin  (mm) P 12  7.6 10.6 8.2 8.5 
Pin/Pitch P/D 1.42  1.21 1.415 1.58 1.54 
W/D 1.32 1.2 1.48 1.7 1.69 1.4 
Active height H [mm] 1000  700 1200 870 775 
H/D 83.  92.1 113.2 106 91.1 
Power density [W/cm3] 140  420 200 300 100 
q’’mean [W/cm
2] 31  92 69.8 38 100 
u0 [m/s] 1.2  1.6 2 0.3 1.1 
ReD       
Pr 0.02  0.02 0.023 0.02 0.023 
Pe 1.4.103 920 1.1.103 2.3.103 500 1.38.103 
Grx 7.04
.1015 2.7.1016 1.56.1016 7.6.1016 9.02.1015 1.9.1016 
GrD 2.56
.107 9.2.106 7.1.105 1.5.107 8.1.106 2.2.107 
0.3.Re/(Gr)0.5 4.15 3.9 10.15 7.7 2.64 3.75  
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Reactor applications- SFR -FA design
 Nominal cond´s:  turbulent, forced convective flow 
 Challenges:  loss of flow  transition to buoyant convection,
 tight lattices (P/D)  strong secondary flows
Reactor type SPX BN600 JSFR EFR  PBFR SNR300 
Configuration pool pool loop pool pool loop 
Lattice       
Spacer types wire wire wire wire spacer spacer 
Pin  (mm)  8.5  10.4 8.2 6.6 7.6 
Pin/Pitch P/D 1.14  1.14 1.18 1.3 1.26 
W/D 1.2 1.19 1.23 1.19 1.32 1.28 
Active height H [mm] 1000  1000 1000 1000 950 
H/D 117.6  96.2 122.0 151.5 125 
Power density [W/cm3] 279  144 242 208 300 
q’’mean [W/cm
2] 112  77 101 138 97 
u0 [m/s] 6.1  3 6.7 7.7 5 
Re   1.2   
Pr 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
Pe 140 267 84 175 273 175 
Grx 1.53
.1012 1.67.1012 1.53.1012 1.53.1012 1.53.10121. 1.31.1012 
GrD 9.4
.105 5.1.105 1.7.106 8.4.105 4.4.105 6.7.105 
0.3.Re/(Gr)0.5 6.2 16 3.2 8.1 17.6 9.2 
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Transmutation – 2 Modes
R. Stieglitz – Seminar GRS
Homogeneous mode
MA diluted in small fraction
in driver fuel
Advantages 
high neutron flux available
fuel behavior slightly affected by 
some % of MA
acceptable MA global quantities 
higher than heterogeneous mode 
Drawbacks 
core safety parameters affected by 
MA insertion (max. MA content 
SFR 3-5%, reduced Doppler 
constant (SFR -15 % for 3% MA), 
coolant coefficient (-5%), delayed 
neutron fraction  (-5%) 
entire fuel supply chain affected by 
transmutation 
Heterogeneous mode : 
MA concentrated in specific
devices, apart from driver fuel
Advantages
transmutation targets placed in 
neutron weak importance 
 marginal impact on core safety 
parameters 
limited numbers of transmutation 
element to manage 
management of driver fuel / 
transmutation targets not coupled
Drawbacks
lower neutron flux level @ periphery
high concentration of MA in targets
important neutron sources and 
decay heat to manage,  lacks in 
material behavior knowledge 
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Transmutation - Impact of MA content
decay heat in
homogeneous mode
increasing with MA 
content
decay heat in 
heterogeneous
substantially lower than in
homogeneous option






© B. Fontaine, SFR-Transmutation, 2014
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Transmutation performance- key core options
neutron spectra (f = (material, coolant, structural materials) 
 affects fission/capture cross-section ratio 
Power density [MW/m3] 
 determines global MA mass  in fuel cycle
Heavy nuclide inventory [kg/MW]  
 affects  neutron flux level
Maximal acceptable MA content , which depends on 
fuel material 
safety parameters (coolant is essential)
R. Stieglitz – Seminar GRS
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Transmutation performance-Comparison of
different FR‘s
SFR flux level higher than LFR/GFR in nearly all energy groups !!!
 cladding/core internals challenge
R. Stieglitz – Seminar GRS
© B. Fontaine, SFR-Transmutation, 2014
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Transmutation performance-Comparison of
different FR‘s
almost similar for GFR/SFR, little penalty for LFR (large coolant fraction) 
R. Stieglitz – Seminar GRS
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Transmutation performance - SFR
in homogeneous mode, auto-recycling  is achieved near 1% 
in heterogeneous mode, MABB+Core has to be considered ! 
in any case Curium production is not stopped 
R. Stieglitz – Seminar GRS
© Verwaerde, CP-ESFR, WP-3, Final report,2013
More details for SFR
Gabrielli, Rineiski et al. , 2015, Energy Procedia, ASTRID-like Fast Reactor Cores for Burning Plutonium & Minor  Actinides, 
Vol. 71, p.130ff
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Transmutation ability
R. Stieglitz – Seminar GRS
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FR- Summary- Reactors & Core Design
Use of liquid metals in fast nuclear systems
Ensures good neutron economy  efficient fuel utilization (CR1)
Transmutation capability limited (type and concept dependent)
Safe reactor concept requires more advanced computational effort
(neutronics , TH-TM and their interaction) 
BUT: physically not impracticable
higher thermal efficiency (high temperatures for power conversion system)
compact design
necessitates high Pu enrichment but allows for high burn-up (mostly
material limiting –clad/or RPV) at  load cycles comparable to LWR
 Why liquid metal cooled fast reactors (FR) are not standard today ?
R. Stieglitz – Seminar RWTH Aachen 26th June 2012
technology gaps (thermal-hydraulics, material issues, instrumentation,…) 
advanced safety requirements (seismic loads, ….) 
public acceptance (or perception –“breeder“)
…… 
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FR-Summary-Reactors & Core Design
Different Fast Reactors = different products although owing a fast neutron-spectrum
different properties (time scales, power density, neutronics, TH-TM and
safety demonstration)
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What distiguishes liquid metals from other liquids ?
Elements suitable for engineering ?
alkali-metals (Li, Na,K+alloys)
basic metals (Pb,Ga,Sn+alloys)
R. Stieglitz et al.
Li Na Na78K22 Pb Sn Pb45Bi55 Ga68In20Sn12 Hg
Tmelt [°C] 180 98 -11 327 232 126 11 -39
Tboiling [°C] 1317 883 785 1743 2687 1533 2300 356
 [kg/m3]* 475 808 750 10324 6330 9660 6440 13534
cp [J/(kgK)] 416 1250 870 150 240 150 350 140
 [(m2/s). 10-7] 7.16 2.6 2.4 1.5 1.6 1.1 3.7 1.1
 [W/(mK)] 49.7 67.1 28.2 15 33 12.8 16.5 8.3
el [A/(Vm).105] 23.5 50 21 7.8 15.9 6.6 8.6 5.7
 [N/m.10-3]
@ T=300°C
421 202 110 442 526 410 460 436
* @ T=600°C, p=105Pa, except GaInSn, Hg (T=20°C)
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What distiguishes liquid metals from other liquids ?
General findings  technical impact
low kinematic viscosity  turbulent flow (H2O~10-6m2/s) 
high heat conductivity  scale separation of thermal from
viscous boundary layer (H2O~0.6W/(mK)) 
 time separation of temperature and velocity
fluctuations (different damping !!!!) 
high surface tension  different bubble transport/interaction mechanisms
 scale separation of velocity field and surface statistics
(high retarding moment)                        (H2O~52mN/m))
high elec. conductivity  velocity field modification by strong fields due to ( )
(Magnetohydrodynamics)
 measurement access by electromagnetic means
 pumping (MHD-Pumps) and/or flow control
opaque  no optical access
high boiling points  wide operational temperature threshold (T)
Complex chemistry  alkali metals with Group V, VI,VII elements
 exotherm. reactions
 heavy metals weak reactions with Group V-VII but 
 dissolution transitional metals (structure materials !!!)
R. Stieglitz et al.
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FACILITIES-TECHNOLOGY @KIT
R. Stieglitz – Seminar RWTH Aachen 26th June 2012










































Flow rate 16 m3/h
Electr. power 250 kW
Test ports 2+2
Oxygen control yes
PbBi inventory 300 l (3 t)
Operating hours 4000
 Development of 
measurement techniques 
for flow, temperature and 
pressures
 Benchmark experiments



















Flow rate 47 m3/h
Electr. power 1200 kW
Test ports 2
Oxygen control yes
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 Facility planned for:
 research activities on liquid metal
(LM) 
 accelerator target development
 studies of LM for solar 
applications
 development of turbulent LM heat
transfer models for CFD tools
 system tool qualification (TRACE)
 Total power: ~ 2MW
 Temp. 150 – 550 °C
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INSTRUMENTATION
R. Stieglitz – Seminar RWTH Aachen 26th June 2012
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How to measure in liquid metals ?
Flow rate – electro-magnetic, p, UTT, momentum based ……..
Visualization techniques
direct – X-Ray tomography
indirect – CIFT, 
Utra-sound-transient time (UTT),….
Velocity
direct – Pitot-Tube (p)
– magnetic potential probes (MPP)
– fibre-mechanics
Non-intrusive – Ultra-sound doppler velocimetry (UDV), multi unitsmapping
Surfaces /2-phase 
direct – resistance probes
Indirect – X-ray, UTT 
– optic means for surfaces
R. Stieglitz et al.
Thermocouples
probe tip 
magnet         
tube          
sup. tube 
probe shaft
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Measurement: Flow rate
Measurement principle
 Dragging of magnetic fields lines by the flow 
(RMS-Value ~Q)
 flow direction given by sign of signal
 time delay between Emitter-Sensor
(or Phase Angle) t~Q
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Measurement: Flow rate-EMFM
Design wishes
 High penetration depth  of field B into duct
( low f f = frequency AC current supply)
 High magnetic field strength (high RMS)
 Large amount of windings ( ~n n=wire turns)
Counter arguments
 Low f yield high sensitivity to ambient stray signals
 High B modifies the flow Hartmann number Ha<<1
(Ha=(EM-forces/viscous forces))





















 clamp on systems
© HZDR © HZDR 
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Measurement: flow visualization- 2 phase-flow
Main feature:
 X-ray visualization of two-phase flows
 Restriction of the mold size in beam direction
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Measurement: flow visualization- 2 phase-flow
Flow rates:
• Ar: 1,7 cm3/s
• Liquid metal: 120-130 ml/sComplex flow regimes
© HZDR © HZDR 





 Distance change from sensor due to
motion from 12 between two pulses. 
 Determination of the time difference
from the phase shift between received
echoes
Velocity at a discrete distance
Profile
 Separation of sound path in time 
intervals (gates t) allows
recording of a velocity profile. 
Therefore,
 Coupling of a time ti with a 
measurement position
 Determination of the local




























































Next puls/Echo    
t
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Good agreement between measurement and
literature profile
Detailed resolution of the velocity profile
Deviation literature profile for r/R>0.6 less than 0.5%
( Schulenberg&Stieglitz, NED, 2010)









Reichardt Re = 80.000
UDV Re = 81.943
u
Measurement :Flow velocity
Ultra-Sound Doppler Velocimeter (UDV)-Validation
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Measurement: Flow velocity
Transient start-up behaviour
of EM pump in THESYS 
Loop
Ultra-Sound Doppler Velocimeter (UDV)
 Fluid temperature: 400°C 
 Temperatur compensation durch 
(Wave Guide) 
 Inclination angle: 45°
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Thermalhydraulic transport in liquid metals
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At a first glance simple: put numerous cells (fluid, solids) in SA geometry 
But: with tremendous effort (correction terms) successful for low Re by CFD  means
Example : Fluid assembly Flow (heated rods)
Momentum transfer: numerical approach
real geometry




120° fluid mesh 
(symmetry)
Extrusion to full length
(here only 60° shown)
44 Million Cells, 
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Momentum transfer: numerical approach
 Momentum transport models based on averaging (e.g. )
 Large Eddy Simulation (LES + adequate subgrid scale modelling)
 Direct Numerical Simulation (DNS)








Gradient models, eddy diffusivity models
l mixing length models li mixing length models
k-l,k-, k-, SST, etc. 
non-linear k-, V2-f and branches
ASM models with k-
transport equations for all second order 
closure moments
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Turbulent momentum transfer: numerical approach
 Quality of CFD computations not defined by number of cells
Reynolds averaged modelling of momentum transport
 Reynolds-Averaged Navier-Stokes (RANS) equations  closure problem in
convective term
 Standard model assumption: gradient hypothesis
 Simplification =   isotropic exchange coefficient
General 
 Turbulent flow modelling demands qualified user (rather than computing power)
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Observation: -high heat conductivity 
R. Stieglitz et al.



















 turbulent heat transport necessitates
dedicated turbulence modelling for 
 heat transport and 
 dissipation
 constant turbulent Prandtl number 
concept (Reynolds analogy) not correct
(standard CFD-models)
 if more cells do not improve the results
(super-slating of a soup!!!)
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Energy transfer: numerical approach
Turbulent energy equation
 Analogous to turbulent viscosity M=t / a turbulent heat flux appears and thus
 a turbulent eddy heat diffusivity H =t /( cp) can be defined, 
 the turbulent Prandt number Prt
Consequences
 Prt is far of being a constant (in reality a tensor)
 Difficult to measure directly, since it is a measure of
 dimensions and
 available sensor sizes as well as the
 temporal resolution)
 Involves several modelling problems
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How to solve the closure problem of the turbulent heat flux?
 Standard approximation: Gradient hypothesis
enforced isotropic exchange coefficient H
 Reynolds – Analogy (Standard in all CFD-Codes)
 Consequences & typical problems (CFD Simulation with standard Prt =0.9)
 u and T- Statistics completely different, Prt is function of Prt =(y, Re, Pr, Gr)
 no anisotropic diffusivity 
 Missing transport characteristics (diffusor, recirculation flows, free jets)
 Zero-dimensional approach is problematic only valid for forced convection 
(otherwise extremely qualified user required)





































Energy transfer: numerical approach
tensor constant
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Energy transfer: numerical approach
Direct numerical Simulation (DNS)
 only chance to obtain transport coefficients but 
 limitation of Reynolds number (flow velocity)
 Formulation of benchmark problems 
Backward facing step
 Stratification problem (buoyancy) at large axial T
 Flow separation at geometry discontinuities
Approach
 Choice of small Pr-Fluid (PrSodium=0.007) 
 LES u-Field is DNS of T-Field 
Goal
 Validity limits of CFD codes.
 Development of advanced
turbulent heat flux models.
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Energy transfer: Validation
Background :   Pin single element of fuel assembly
Scope :      Turb. heat transfer in forced, mixed and buoyant convective flows (Re6.105)
Measure:         Development of models for turbulent heat flux;
 Determination of Nu-correlations;













3  Rakes (60 TC´s, d=0.25mm)
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Observation: -high heat conductivity 
R. Stieglitz et al.
Energy transfer: “real world”
u0
Conds: 
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Energy Transfer: Heated Rod- developing flow
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n 0.752 ; b
b Db
Nu∞ according to Dwyer:












Energy transfer: “real world” -reactor qualification
Strategy 
Single pin Bundle     Assembly simulator
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Turbulent Heat Transfer : assembly simulator
© Wetzel et al. @IKET-KIT
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Engineering  in liquid metals
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Engineering: LM-Pumps
Liquid metal operated loops utilize often MHD-pumps, why ?
 Low maintenance costs (absence of sealings, bearings, moving parts),
 Low degratation rate of structure material,
 Simple replacement of inductor,
 Fine regulation of flow rate and pump characteristics (p‘/p, V‘/V<<1).
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Engineering: LM-Pumps
Sodium operated Annular Linear Induction Pump (ALIP)
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Development of new pump types at KIT 
(ACHIP -Alternating Current Helical Induction Pump)
Motivation
 High price of EM-pumps, no competition
 Inspection, sealings
 complex set-up and loop integration
Ansatz
 Use of stator of asynchroneous motor 
(e.g. old pump, crane motor,….)
 design of liquid metal duct in stator
 Compensation of eddy current losses 
by rotating soft iron core (in bearings)
Advantages
 Low construction price (1/10 to EM pump)
 No sealings, conventional parts, pumpin in both directions possible
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Functional and performance tests of ACHIP







 f =30 Hz        















 Successful operation 
 First shot : acceptable efficiency  max=14% no optimization 
 Next optimization 
instead soft iron permanent magnets,  
Use of 4 pole instead of 2 pole stator 
 Resonable agreement between model and FOAK demonstrator
NaK pump in  MEKKA @KIT
Engineering -Pumps






 Design, Computation and Construction of MHD pumps









Annular Linear Induction Pump (ALIP) ACHIP –(Alternating Current Helical Induction Pump)
Sodium -ALIP







 f =30 Hz        

















© Stieglitz &Zeininger, Magnetohydrodynamics, 2009
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Engineering – Materials -SFR
Sodium can cause corrosion
depending mainly on oxygen content
Kinetics for stainless steels 
available up to  5000 h at 550°C for 
[O]<10 µg/g
Ferritic steels more sensitive to 
oxidation and carburizationthan austenitic steels
9Cr steels exhibit a similar behavior
 Vast database and operational experience available
 Joining techniques qualified 
 No dissolution attack 
R. Stieglitz – Seminar GRS
More details: Courouau et al., 2013,Corrosion by oxidation and carburization in liquid sodium at 550°C of austenitic steels for 
sodium fast reactors, Paris  FR13 
© CORONA @ CEA
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Engineering – Materials SFR
Sodium-Fire  coupled for CDA scenarios with source term
Old experiments available (FAUNA, CABRI,..) basis for code development
R. Stieglitz – Seminar GRS
© Latge, 2015, ESNII, Workshop
(Contain-LMR)
Gordeev, Hering, Schikorr, Stieglitz ,2012, Validation of CONTAIN-LMR code for accident analysis of sodium-cooled fast 
reactor containments, ICAPP 2012 Chicago, pp. 2088-2095. Paper ID 12155 or ICAPP 2013
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Material selection: depends strongly on liquid 















420°C / 4000 h 550°C / 4300 h 600°C / 4000 h
Material
Austenitic steel (316L-type) 
Influence of temperature on material compatibility
at optimal oxygen concentration 10-6 wt%
Result
Austenitic steels operable without protection for 
temperatures below 500 °C
30µm 30µm 60µm
Engineering -Materials
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500°C 550°C 600°C 650°C
Start of corrosion
Oxidation
oxide scale    
oxide scale
LBE   
Material:
F/M steel (HCM12a -type) 
Influence of temperature on material compatibility
at optimal oxygen concentration 10-6 wt%
Result
Martensitic steels operable below ≤ 550 °C.
huge oxidation rate: up to 50 -100µm/10.000 h
and frequent spallation of oxide scale.
 contamination of liquid metal
 reduced heat removal capability 1W/mK)( 43OM 
Engineering -Materials
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SAFETY AND SYSTEM DYNAMICS
- LFR (ORIENTED)
R. Stieglitz – Seminar RWTH Aachen 26th June 2012
 ADS involves additional considerations
 SFR scenarios consist of tenth of aspects- most of
them couteracting requiring an own lecture.*
* More nformation
D. Verwaerde, R. Stieglitz, Final-Report-EU-Project, CP-ESFR-WP3-Safey, 2013  or
Kruessmann, Ponomarev,Pfrang, Struwe, Champigny, Carluec, Schmitt, Verwaerde, 2015, Assessment of SFR reactor 
safety issues: Part II: Analysis results ofULOF transients imposed on a variety of different innovative coredesigns with SAS-
SFR, NED, 2015, 285, p.263-283 
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GEN-IV–Guidelines
Generation IV Roadmap goals
 safety and reliability, 
 economics, 
 sustainability, and 
 proliferation resistance and physical protection.
 TRANSLATION of GEN-IV Criteria
 Excellent behaviour  in operational safety and reliability;
 Low likelihood and degree of core damage;
 Elimination of need for off-site emergency responses in case of severe accident. 
 Technical solution 
 seek simplified designs, 
 Two design axis 
 reduce/eliminate the potential for entering into severe plant conditions-
prevention of core damage accidents (CDA), 
 minimize the respective consequences (radiological releases)- mitigation. 
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Safety approach FR 
core design with improved natural behavior during sequences without 
active protection
Types of events to be considered 
Reactivity insertion 
Liquid metal draining (generalized boiling, gas ingress ...) 
Inadvertent control rod withdrawal 
Core compaction (earthquake ...) 
Loss of core cooling 
Loss of primary/secondary flow (pump failures, loss of electricity sources ...)
Flow blockage in some assemblies 
R. Stieglitz – Seminar GRS
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LFR Safety approach- Incidents/Accidents
Incident/Accident Description
Reactivity & power distribution 
anomalies
 Inadvertent control rod assembly withdrawal
 Control rod assembly ejection/drop
 Changes in core geometry (earthquake) 
 Failures/malfunctions of DHR System
 Fuel assembly loaded in an incorrect position/ composition
 SG tube rupture
 Fuel rod failure
increase of heat removal from 
primary system,
 Inadvertent actuation of DHR systems
 Reduction in feedwater temperature
 Increase in feedwater flow
 Excessive increase in sec. steam flow
 Inadvertent opening of SG safety valve
decrease of heat removal by 
secondary system,
 SG feedwater system line break, 
 Loss of normal feed 
 Turbine trip
 Inadvertent closure of main steam isolation valves 
 Loss of load
 Loss of AC power
 FW pump failure or malfunction
 SG Flow blockage
 FW line break
 Grouping of relevant  Incidents and Accidents
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LFR Safety approach-Incidents/Accidents
Incident/Accident Description
decrease in primary coolant 
system flow rate,
 Fuel Assembly Partial Blockage 
 Fuel Assembly Mechanical Lock Failure
 Mechanical/ electrical failure of primary pump (Partial loss of 
flow-PLOF)
 Loss of electrical supplies to primary pumps (Complete loss 
of Flow-LOF)
 Pump Shaft Break/Seizure
decrease in primary coolant 
inventory
 Loss of coolant accident (LOCA) resulting from Main vessel 
leakage or break
challenges to reactor building.  Steam line break
 Cover Gas line break
 Leakage from Vessel Top Closure
 Fuel Handling Accident
 Grouping of relevant  Incidents and Accidents
 Regrouping of Events into DBC 2 , DBC 3, …….
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LFR- Design background
 LFR = class of LMFBRs (Liquid Metal-cooled Fast Reactors)  similar intrinsic 
characteristics as SFRs
 fast neutron spectrum, 
 positive void coefficients for larger core designs
 LFR rely on a different base-technology  (lead vs. sodium)  different response to 
transient initiators due to:
 boiling point of Pb-coolant : > 1700 °C for LFR
 boiling point of Na-coolant :   ~ 900 °C for SFR
 Coolant boiling  positive reactivity insertion in large LMFBRs (advantage to SFRs).
 In LFRs  positive reactivity insertions starts ~ 1300 °C (due to melting and 
subsequent removal of cladding material from the core region. 
 No credible transient initiator so far identified leading to core temperatures >1100 °C 
(aside of total SA flow blockage)  LFR are thus not expected to experience any 
serious energetic core degradation events. 
 No large-scale exothermic chemical interactions between Pb (or LBE) and water
 No currently known large-scale hydrogen production sources using Pb (or LBE) as 
coolant
 LFR Core meltdown has already been experienced in Russia. Reason: gradual flow 
degradation / blockage due to coolant loop slugging (Pb-oxide accumulation and 
deposition in flow channels).
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LFR- Challenges
Operational issues:
 Melting point of Pb at ~ 327 °C requires that LFR is maintained at all times during its
operational life at temperatures in excess of at leat 330 °C.
 Overcooling transient (secondary side) can lead to freezing at the outlet of the heat exchanger (SG) on 
the primary side leading to a partial loss of flow
 Lead technology: 
 Corrosion/erosion of structural materials (coolant quality control, coating of primary loop structural
materials – cladding, HX tubes)
 Slugging of primary coolant loop (lead-oxide accumulation)
Challenges :
 Overcooling: (By diversity and redundancy assure that SG secondary inlet temperatures
does not fall below 330 °C ( assured high pressure on secondary side - water >> note: currently remaining
weak link in LFR fullfilling „totally passive“ design criteria)
 seismic risk due to large mass of lead;
 in-service inspection of core support structures/replacing of internal components
 refueling at high temperature in lead; spent fuel management by remote handling;
 managing of the SG tube rupture inside the primary system;
 prevention of flow blockage and mitigation of core consequences;
 development of techniques and instrumentations for coating (i.e. aluminization...) of 
steam generators and reactor vessel
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ELSY REACTOR
 Verify for all design basis 
accident conditions ability of 
the protection system to bring 
and maintain the reactor in safe 
conditions:
 The coolant, core materials 
and vessel structure safety 
limits are not exceeded
 Decay heat removal in the 
short and long term 
ELSY DESIGN
SAFETY LIMITS (Therm. power = 1500 MW, T-lead = 400 – 480 °C) 
 Lead properties: boiling point = 1740 °C, freezing point = 327.5 °C
 Clad temperature <550 °C (DBC1) up 700 - 800 °C (DBC4 – no systematic clad failure)
 Large margin to fuel melting (DBC2) – Only local fuel melting (DBC4)
 Vessel wall temperature < 450 °C – 550 °C (DBC1 – DBC4)
LFR- Safety study (ELSY Project)
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LFR -DBC Transient Analysis in ELSY
ELSY REACTOR
List of representative DBC transients in (ELSY) safety analysis:
 All primary pump trip (PLOF)  Natural circulation in the primary system
 Transient overpower (PTOP)  Control rod withdrawal 
 Transient overpower (PTOP at CZP) (T = 380 °C)
 All SG feedwater trip (PLOH)  Decay heat removal by DHR-2 system (ICs on 
secondary side)
 All SG feedwater trip + primary pump trip (PLOF+PLOH) (Station blackout)
 PLOF+PLOH without DHR
 Vessel leakage (lead level –1 m)  partial uncovery of steam generators
 Overcooling of primary side  Loss of feedwater pre-heating  Risk for lead freezing
 Large break in secondary circuits  Depress. of SS  Activation of DHR-1 on primary 
side
 Steam generator tube rupture
Decay heat removal system
 Two independent and redundant (3 out of 
4) systems are available:
 DHR-1: 4 W-DHR loops working in 
natural circulation on primary side
 DHR-2: 4 IC loops working in natural 
circulation on secondary side
Reactivity feedbacks
 Doppler (negative)
 Radial core exp. (Diagrid, negative)
 Axial fuel exp. (negative)
 Coolant exp. (positive in the active core, 
negative outside the active core)
 Axial clad exp. (positive)
 Control rod drive exp. (positive)
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- 4 with IC
- 4 without IC










601- 4                               
661- 4
Active Core
 3 zones + average pin
 3 hot channels + peak pin
SG primary side
 5 radial meshes

























© Bandini, 2011, 
ENEA
RELAP5-Model of ELSY
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LFR PLOF: All Primary Pump Trip
Lead Flowrate at Core Inlet Core Temperatures
 Primary flowrate reduces to about 20% of nominal value in few seconds after 
primary pump trip at t=1000 s (low pump inertia)
 Reactor scram at t=1003 s on low primary pump speed signal
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Core Flow rate, Core and SG Powers Core and Vessel Temperatures
 Natural circulation in the primary system stabilizes at 25% of nominal value
 Core neutronic power slightly reduces around 95% during the transient phase
 After an initial peak up to 863 °C lasting few tens of seconds the maximum clad 
temperature stabilizes below 800 °C 
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 increase of maximum fuel temperature is not very significant (about 100 °C)
 positive diagrid and temperature feedbacks counterbalanced by Doppler effect
 grace time greater than half a hour is assured before fuel rod clad failure might occur 
in the hottest FA (confirmed by the analysis with the SIM-LFR code)
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Fuel (in half a hour)




























Clad (in half a hour)
Clad (in one hour)
LFR - Max. Core Temperatures (Unprotected Accidents)
Max Clad Temperature
Max Fuel Temperature
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EFIT Design :
 Two-loop design (147 bar, 335°C)
 No intermediate loop
 4 pumps / 8 internal heat exchangers
 Pumps located in hot leg
 Core with MA load
 High positive void worth
Concerns :
 Steam ingress into core
 Pb-Water interaction with (CCI)
 Pressure build-up and voiding
 Sloshing, plenum pressurization, …
 Detection
LFR – DEC Safety Analyses : SGTR accident 
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 Analyses performed with SIMMER-III code
 SIMMER-III validation for multiphase flows in HLM
ruptured
SG tubes
LFR – DEC Safety Analyses : SGTR accident 
© Maschek et al. @IKET-KIT-G
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EFIT as Basis :
 Scale factor to EFIT: ~1:4
 19 pin bundle (solid pins)
 EFIT SG design
 Pb: 480 °C, 1 atm, 0.8 m/s
 H2O vapor: 400 °C, 240 bar, 
 FZK Experiment on SGTR

























LFR – DEC Safety Analyses : SGTR accident 
© Wetzel & Maschek et al. @IKET-KIT-G
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Summary
 Liquid metal and esepcially heavy liquid metals pose specific 
technological & scientific challenges towards realization of a reactor in terms:
 Instrumentation, 
 thermalhydraulics in heat transfer and free surface flows,
 ISI&R (in-service insepction & repair)  
 Material development. 
 Considerable progress has been made in many fields thanks to European programs and 
establishment of a Pb-Technology society 
 Nevertheless technological issues poses still challenges  such as 
 Deficits in commercial CFD codes to predict MHD flows, heat transfer problems and free 
surface flows in low Prandtl number fluids even in the steady case with a reliable accuracy
 (in-situ, non-invasive) in core flow monitoring 
 LFR safety profited from the progress made so that developed LFR design exhibit a 
principle and safe feasibility. However, still
 generic experiments in many fields aimed are to be performed to 
 develop advanced physical models for heat transfer & free surface problems
 generate a broad  data base & local correlations for design purposes
to allow for PSA and reliable safety assessment 
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SUPPLEMENTARY
R. Stieglitz – Seminar RWTH Aachen 26th June 2012
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LFR Roadmap
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Momentum Transfer (Turbulent flow)   MICROSCALE
Modelling of turbulent momentum transport by CFD means
 Reynolds-Averaged Navier-Stokes (RANS) equations  closure problem in convective
term
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Momentum Transfer (Turbulent flow)   MICROSCALE








Gradient models, eddy diffusivity models
l mixing length models li mixing length models
k-l,k-, k-, SST, etc. 
non-linear k-, V2-f and branches
ASM models with k-
transport equations for all second order 
closure moments
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Momentum Transfer (Turbulent flow)   MICROSCALE
Modelling by CFD means
 Decision of anisotropic modelling demands qualified user 
 Anisotropic measures are relevant if 
 Wall conditions are f (y,z) (y,z …. lateral coordinates)
 Geometry yields Wall= f (y,z) as e.g. bundle flows (Wall …wall shear stress)
 Resolution of viscous sublayer is required (nozzles- relaminarization of BL, orifices-detached 
flow) (low Re-models)
 Experimentally demonstrated in numerous experiments *1
 Num. solutions for bundles (anisotr.mixing length models*2, phenomen. models*3, non-lin k-*4)
 Super-imposed temporal perturbations (e.g. oscillations-bundle flows with small P/D,
pump oscillations, etc.) cause travelling patterns or fluid structure interaction.
Solution method ?
 First clarification of frequency f and time scales by analytic means if 
 f  fSGS,edge  LES-Simulation
 f < fturbulence  URANS
 Ultimate solution Direct Numerical Simulation (DNS) (containing all time and length 
scales without any reduced physical models)
*1 Quarmby, Quirk 
1972,1974 
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Momentum Transfer (Turbulent flow)   MICROSCALE
Other problems in u-field calculations ?
 Low or High Re model selection: Required pre-requisite
 Less sensitivty and more freedom (partly realized by combined models)
 Detailed analytic pre-analysis necessary by user to evaluate, BL-modification, flow instabilities
 Improved near wall treatment at high Reynolds numbers : Required pre-requisite 
 Wall conditions for separated flows
 Wall conditions for buoyant flows (thermal wall function T+=f(Prt,x), spatial resolution y+.Pr<<10 
)  
 Time-dependent large scale fluctuations only achievable by LES : Required pre-requisite
 Sub-Grid Scale (SGS) models 
 Inlet- and wall conditions
 Code performance (stability, relaxation models, convergence, numerical scheme)
 Development is an ongoing process in all fluid dynamic fields 
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Turbulent heat flux modeling
2'TAvailable turbulent diffusion models for 
Scalar     GDH
Tensorial GDH
still no influence of the 
molec. Pr

























































Heat Transfer (Turbulent flow)   MICROSCALE
Institut für Neutronenphysik und Reaktortechnik92
LFR - Fundamental Safety Objectives
 General nuclear safety objective: 
Protection of individuals, society and the environment by establishing & 
maintaining an effective defence against radiological hazard;
 Radiation protection objective: 
Assurance in normal operation that radiation exposure in plant and due to any 
release of radioactive material from plant is As Low As Reasonably Achievable 
(ALARA)…. and are below prescribed limits and to ensure mitigation of the 
extent of radiation exposure due to accidents;
 Technical safety objective: 
Prevention of accidents to ensure that for all accidents taken into account in 
plant are of very low probability, radiological consequences, if any, would be 
minor; and to ensure that the likelihood of severe accidents with serious 
radiological consequences is extremely small. 








LFR target 0.1 mSv/y
as EUR (Rev C)
ICRP 60 individ. dose <20 mSv/year during 5 years with a 
maximum value of 50 mSv during 1 year.
LFR = EUR target:
individual dose <5 mSv/year, 0.5 man-Sv/unit for annual collective 
dose averaged over the plant life
DBC 2
Releases from DBC 2 conditions shall not cause annual release criteria to be exceeded
 each DBC 2 operating condition shall individually meet the annual release criteria
DBC 3 1 mSv/event [2]




objective is minimization of requirements for emergency planning & offsite
countermeasures [4]
[1] This shall be assessed for the most exposed individual:  At 100 m from the most significant sources with an occupancy 
factor of 1/30, or  at 300 m with an occupancy factor of 1.
[2] 1 mSv is EFR  value and consistent with EUR value.
[3] 5 mSv is 1/10 of EFR  value and consistent with EUR value.
[4] These requirements should  be defined for GEN IV  reactors, and compared  to EUR  ones.
LFR -Safety Objectives
Slide after  
J. Carretero
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 Five levels are defined in
defence-in-depth strategy.
 DiD concept applied to safety-
related activities and measures,
(incl. design, organisational and
behavioural factors).
 DiD adequacy established by
number of barriers and number and
quality of systems in each level of
defence.
 Objective is inherent exclusion of
possibility of core damage
accidents and elimination of need







Prevention of abnormal 
operation and failures
Conservative design 




Control of abnormal 
operation and detection 
of failures
Control, limiting and 




Control of accidents 
within the design basis
Engineered safety 
features and accident 
procedures
Level 4
Control of severe plant 
conditions (incl. 
prevention of accident 
progression & mitigation 
of consequences of 
severe accidents
Complementary 
features and accident 
management
Level 5
Mitigation of radiological 
consequences of 




LFR -Basic Safety 
Design Concept: 
Defense in Depth (DiD)
Slide courtesy of J. Carretero
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DBC divided into categories:
 DBC1: normal operating conditions;
power operation, normal transients
(start-up, shutdown, load following…),
commissioning)
 DBC2: incidents or Anticipated
Operational Occurrences (AOO)
 DBC3, DBC4: accidents.
DEC = Complex sequences and limiting events
 Complex sequences= unlikely sequences going beyond those considered in
deterministic design basis (in terms of failure of equipment, or operator errors)
and potentially to lead to significant releases but do not involve core melt.
 Severe accidents= Severe accidents are certain unlikely events beyond DBC 4
involving significant core damage potentially leading to significant environmental
releases (Fukushima).
 Fundamental safety approach=Avoiding wherever possible any severe and
generalized damage to the core.





Initiating event occurrence 
frequency range (per reactor 
year)






10-2 > Ef > 10-4
DBC4
Accident
10-4 > Ef > 10-6
Initiating event categories
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LFR -Qualitative Criteria for Fuel & Cladding 
Category Fuel limits Cladding limits
Normal operation No degradation No clad failure 
DBC2
No degradation
No clad failure, except due to 
random effects or for 
experimental pins 
DBC3 No melting * No systematic clad failure 
(i.e. large number) 
DBC4
Any predicted localised melting* 
to be demonstrated 
acceptable




No severe core damage: 
(e.g. no criticality risk, decay heat removal capability, no large number 
of pin failures (leakage))
Severe accidents
Coolability of the damaged core within the primary system enclosure 
(e.g. no criticality risk, decay heat removal capability) 
* melting here means degradation leading to clad failure
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LFR -Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) 
Consideration of three PSA –Levels
Level 1: Assessment of plant failure  “core damage frequency”;
Level 2: Assessment of containment response  containment release frequency/ 
release fractions;
Level 3: Assessment of off-site consequences  estimation of public risk.
Statement:
PSA limitations to innovative concepts characterized by 
 large uncertainties, 
 lack of reliable data 
 incomplete & precise knowledge about provisions
 sparse understanding of degradation and failure machanisms
Additional tools complementing PSA:
 Objective Provision Tree (OPT) = practical tool applied to design and to assess the 
structure of the safety architecture coherently with the DiD philosophy.
 Line of Protection (LOP) integrates all sort of provisions and characterizes their 
reliability and the conditions of their mutual independence.
 A Master Logic Diagram (MLD) then applied to LFR plant, in order to give a list of 
events for the re-evaluation of consequences of representative transient initiators.
 All relevant transient initiators are analyzed in form of MLDs (example follows): 
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From Schikorr, Bandini, Bubelis – IAEA/GRS Workshop  22.November 2011,  Garching
 Increase in Heat Removal from Reactor Coolant System
LFR – PSA /MLD
MLD for the case: 
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LFR - Hazards assessement
Internal hazards External hazards
 Fires.
 Failures of pressure  retaining 
components;
 Flooding (water, steam).
 Failure of supports and other 
structural components.
 Explosions.
 Missiles from disruptive failure of 
rotating machinery (turbine failure).
 Dropped or impacting loads.
 Release of gases toxic or noxious 
substances.





 Extremes of temperature/ winds.











 Safety demonstration includes consideration of harzards
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 Inadvertent control rod assembly withdrawal
 Control rod assembly drop
 Inadvertent actuation of DHR systems
 Reduction in feedwater temperature
 Increase in feedwater flow
 Excessive increase in secondary steam flow
 Inadvertent opening  of SG SS safety valve
 Loss of normal feed 
 Turbine trip
 Inadvertent closure of main steam isolation valves 
 Loss of load
 Loss of AC power
 Mechanical or an electrical failure of a primary pump (Partial loss of flow)
Accident 
DBC 3
 Control rod assembly ejection
 Fuel assembly loaded in an incorrect position
 Fuel assembly loaded with incorrect composition
 Loss of electrical supplies to primary pumps (Complete loss of Flow)
 Steam generator tube rupture
 Separation of  Incidents and Accidents
List from D4:  M. Frogheri
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 Pump Shaft Break
 Pump Shaft Seizure
 SG feedwater system line break, 
 Fuel Assembly Partial Blockage 
 SG flow Partial Blockage
 Steam line break
 Cover Gas line break
 Feed line break
 Fuel Handling Accident
Accident 
DEC 
 Changes in core geometry due to earthquake (Large core compaction)
 Simultaneous main and safety vessels rupture
 Main vessel break
 Separation of  Incidents and Accidents
List from D4:  M. Frogheri
Result : “Risk-informed” plant design
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DiD and Risk-Informed Safety

Master Logic Diagram
Objective: Generation of safety requirements by integrating both 
deterministic and probabilistic success criteria.
LFR Safety approach- “Risk-informed” plant design
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acceptableNormal operating limits 
No need for protective 
measures
Limited protective measures 
in area and time
Safety objectives
RRC-A: multiple failures situations, without core melt
RRC-B: core melt situations 
PCC: Plant Condition Category
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LFR –DBC/DEC Transient Analysis in ELSY
TRANSIENT 
Initiating Event 












All primary pumps 
trip 
1003 s 
Low pump speed 
1000 s 1003 s 1003 s 
DHR-2 
at 1003 s 
PTOP at HFP 
(C. rod withdrawal) 
+200 pcm in 10 s     
at HFP 
1005 s 
Power > 120% 
no 1005 s 1005 s 
DHR-2 
at 1005 s 
PTOP at CZP 
+350 pcm in 10 s  
at CZP (380 °C) 
1010 s, High power 
or low period 
no - - no 
PLOH 
All SG feedwater 
trip 
1035 s 
T-core out > 500 °C 
no 1000 s 1003 s 
DHR-2 
at 1003 s 
PLOF + PLOH 
(Station Blackout) 
All SG feedwater + 
primary pump trip 
1000 s 
Station Blackout 
1000 s 1000 s 1000 s 
DHR-2 
at 1000 s 
PLOF + PLOH 
without DHR 
All SG feedwater + 
primary pump trip 
1000 s 
Station Blackout 
1000 s 1000 s 1000 s no 
LOCA  
(Vessel leakage)  
Vessel level         
-1 m in 10 s 
1040 s 
T-core out > 500 °C 
no 1040 s 1040 s 
DHR-2 
at 1040 s 
Over-Cooling of 
Primary Side 
Loss of pre-heaters 
(Tin -40 °C in 70 s) 
1070 s 
T-core in < 360 °C 
no 1070 s 1070 s 
DHR-2 
at 1070 s 





T-core out > 500 °C 
no 1003 s 1003 s 
DHR-1 
at 1060 s 
 Main Events and Reactor Scram Thresholds in Protected Accidents 
 All DBC Transients have been analyzed also in case of
Unprotected Transients (DEC -that is without reactor scram)












































Lead Flowrate at Core Inlet Core Temperatures
 Natural circulation in the primary circuit stabilizes at about 6% of nominal value after 
primary pump and SG feedwater trip @ t=1000s 
 Clad peak temperature rises up to 637 °C at t = 1007 s (Reactor scram @ t=1000s)
LFR - PLOF+LOH: Station Blackout (1)
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LFR- PLOF+LOH: Station Blackout (2)
Core, SGs and DHR Powers Clad and Vessel Temperatures
 SGs power in excess to DHR power by steam release through relief valves
 DHR power (3 IC loops+RVACS*) exceeds the decay power within one hour transient











































*RVACS=Reactor Vessel Auxiliary Cooling System
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LFR PTOP: Control Rod Withdrawl
Core Power Core Temperatures
 +200pcm in 10 s  Reactor scram at t=1005s on high neutronic power signal (> 
120%)
 Core power rises up to 2040 MW in 5 s (136% of nominal value)  
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LFR- UTOP: Control Rod Withdrawl (1)
Core Flow rate, Core and SG 
Powers 













































 Initial core power rise up to 186% of nominal value, then core power is balanced by 
the SG power removal at 126% of nominal value (no control on secondary side)
 Maximum clad & vessel wall temperatures rises and stabilizes at 647°C and 475°C 
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LFR -UTOP: Control Rod Withdrawl (2)
















































 Max. fuel temperature rises quickly up to 2772°C (T =718 °C), then stabilizes down 
to 2490°C  No significant fuel melting, but local melting in centerline of fuel pellets 
of hottest FA cannot be excluded
 Reactivity inserted is counterbalanced by negative Doppler and Diagrid feedbacks
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LFR- PLOH: All SGs Feedwater Trip
 Reactor scram at t = 1035 s on core outlet temperature > 500 °C 
 Clad peak temperature rises up to 550 °C which is within the normal operation limit
 Core power and then fuel temperature reduce before reactor scram due to negative 
Diagrid feedback
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Core Flow rate, Core and SG Powers Core and Vessel Temperatures
 Core power progressively reduces to decay level after ~ half a hour from transient 
initiation due to temperature reactivity feedbacks 
 Max. clad temp. rises up to 727 °C – Critical point is vessel wall temperature exceeding 
DBC4 limit of 550 °C after about 6 minutes
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Core Temperatures Reactivity and Feedbacks
 Negative Diagrid feedback mainly counterbalanced by positive Doppler 
feedback associated with large fuel temperature drop










































































LFR – DEC Safety Analyses : SGTR accident 
